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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
TAMRA M. MARTIN,
Petitioner and Appellant,

Case No. 20071017-CA

vs.
Priority No.
ANTHONY NEIL COLONNA,
Respondent and Appellee.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

ARGUMENT
L

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT AND ENTER
A PROTECTIVE ORDER BECAUSE THE PARTIES WERE
COHABITANTS AT THE TIME PETITIONER FILED.
In his response, the Respondent concedes that the trial court erred in finding that

the parties are not currently cohabitants. The Respondent seems to assert that the trial
court's finding that the parties were not cohabitcints is harmless error. Petitioner disagrees
that finding that the parties are not currently cohabitants is harmless error: the Petitioner
had standing to file a protective order against her father; the trial court made a finding
that she had been abused; and the trial court should have entered the protective order on
those bases. Therefore, the Petitioner requests that this Court reverse the trial court and
enter a permanent protective order.

1

Respondent seems to state that the finding that the parties are not currently
cohabitants is harmless error. He states that the trial court correctly dismissed the request
for protective order because much of the abuse took place while Ms. Martin was a minor
child living with the Respondent. He alleges that abuse to a child living with a parent
does not qualify a Petitioner for a protective order because a minor child is statutorily
exempted from the legislative definition of "cohabitant" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78B-7-102 (3) (2008), and, pursuant to footnote 8 of Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158,
1165 (Utah 2002), only abuse occurring while the parties were cohabitants should be
considered.
This interpretation is contradicted by the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78B7-103 (2008), which states:
(1) Any cohabitant who has been subjected to abuse or domestic violence,
or to whom there is a substantial likelihood of abuse or domestic violence,
may seek an ex parte protective order or a protective order in accordance
with this chapter .. .
The statute requires only a finding that the parties are cohabitants at the time of
filing to grant standing in a protective order action. There is no statutory requirement that
the parties must have been cohabitants at all times when domestic violence occurred in
order for the domestic violence to be a basis for issuance of a protective order.
This case is markedly different from the circumstances to which the Court referrec
in footnote 8 of the Bailey decision. In that case, the court considered whether abuse or
domestic violence occurred while the Bailey parties were cohabitants. The Bailey parties
were both adults divorcing after a long marriage. A protective order filed by an adult
2

child against a parent is very different. Children are statutorily exempted from filing for a
protective order against a parent while they are minors. In every other respect, a child is
clearly a "cohabitant" of a parent with whom he or she resides. Ms. Martin resided in the
same household with her father until her parents separated and divorced. The Court found
that Mr. Colonna physically abused Ms. Martin while she was living with him. (Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Dism. of Pet. for Protective Order at 1).
II.

IT IS NECESSARY TO GOOD PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE COURT TO
CONSIDER ABUSE COMMITTED AGAINST MS- MARTIN AS A CHILD.
It would be against public policy to bar Ms. Martin from seeking a protective

order based on childhood abuse because the abuse occurred before she qualified as a
cohabitant. The legislature did not grant a child standing to file for an adult protective
order because the legislature provided that a child may be protected against an abuser if
someone files a child protective order on his or her behalf in juvenile court. A child may
not file his or her own child protective order in juvenile court, and despite many instances
of serious abuse, no one filed to protect Ms. Martin against her father while she was a
child. At age nineteen, Ms. Martin sought protection from the courts. Prior to age
eighteen, Ms. Martin had neither standing to file a child protective order for herself nor
standing to file an adult protective order. To bar Ms. Martin from relying on childhood
abuse as a basis for entry of an adult protective order would also violate Ms. Martin's
rights to equal protection under the laws. It would place her in danger by barring the
court from considering serious abuse occurring prior to her majority.

3

IN ORDER TO LOOK AT THE "TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES," THE COURT MUST CONSIDER PAST CONDUCT
OF THE PARTIES.
In his response brief, the Respondent cites this i ••.: I'S approval o f l a n g u a g e i n in
B o m e k v. B o n i e k , I T f I V1 "J VHi Vnf \ Mii.n < f \ p | I'W<>i in support the proposition
that the trial court must weigh the evidence in the "totality of the circumstances" to
determine whether entry of a protective order is warranted. Id,

circumstances also involves looking at past abuse. The Boniek decision states, "Past
abusive behavior, although not dispositive, is a factor in determining cause for
pioicuioii/' Id.
The trial court made a finding that "Petitioner was physically struck by the
respondent while her parents were married and residing together." (Findings of Fact,
Conclusions ot 1 aw ami D I M \

'( IVI << i P ' o i i v l a • ' H 'i i i1 ' ' ' is u 1 \n *MI I "< • ll1 c

court to properly analyze the Petitioner's case without considering abuse to her as a
minor child.
I he Respondent argues that tl le ti ial :oi n t's fit idii lgs w ei e sufficiei itl> detailed t :>
allow the court to find that given the "totality of the circumstances," there was not a
substantial likelihood of imminent danger to the Petitioner. (Response Brief at 5). The
Petitioner disagrees uiai um • uirt need i i lake a findii lg tl ial; tl le I *etitioi lei n mst be in
in in ! linent dai lgei ' I lie Bailey case provides that ". . . a petitioner may alternatively seek a
protective order if he or she has been 'subjected to abuse or domestic violence.'" 52 P.3d
ofn

^ ' ii -: temphasis in original).
4

Petitioner submits that the trial court's findings were sufficient to conclude that
she had been subjected to abuse or domestic violence. Petitioner also submitted evidence
to the trial court that the Respondent had recently threatened her life over the phone,
which shows a substantial likelihood of imminent danger to the Petitioner. The trial court
made no findings as to whether the threat occurred, finding only that the phone call
occurred, and that the Respondent was "angry."' (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Dism. of Pet. for Protective Order at 1). In the alternative, if this Court determines
that the past abuse to the Petitioner is not enough of itself to grant the protective order,
this court should remand the case to the trial court, directing the court to make a finding
on the material point of whether the Respondent told the Petitioner that he "wished [she]
weren't alive, and that [she] was never born, and that he could take care of that for [her],"
as she alleges. (R. at 47).
Conclusion
The Petitioner/Appellant respectfully requests that this Court find that as a
cohabitant of the Respondent and a victim of past abuse, she is entitled to the entry of a
protective order, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-103(1) (2008). In the alternative,
she requests that this Court reverse the decision and remand it to the trial court to make
additional findings as necessary.
DATED, this 5 t h

day of gfpjembef , 2008.

Otitic
Patricia K. Abbott
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant
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